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Will Our Customers 
Bail Us Out?
 
by David Silverman
 
•
 
How much should 
Clarinda’s president 
divulge to customers 
about the company’s 
difficulties?
 
Four commentators offer 
expert advice.
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Unlike the typical HBR Case, which uses a ﬁctional narrative to present a common managerial 
dilemma and concrete solutions from experts, this Case is based on real events. 
The names of some people and companies have been changed.
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The Clarinda Company is struggling and may go under. Asking 
customers for help could aid the effort to keep the company afloat—
or torpedo it.
 
“What will I ﬁnd if I open the trunk?” the
cop asked.
“Textbooks,” I said.
“What are you, encyclopedia salesmen?”
“No, we typeset books.”
“You,” he said, pointing at Rich in the
driver’s seat. “Out of the car.”
I watched the cop frisk my chief ﬁnancial
ofﬁcer and then escort him back to the high-
way patrol car—leaving me alone. He looked
hardly half my age and had all the sunglass-
wearing bluster of a recent academy graduate.
Leaving the cruiser’s multicolored roof lights
oscillating at top speed, he aimed the door-
mounted searchlight at me to obscure what he
was doing to Rich, who was now sitting in the
cop car’s passenger seat, arms folded. But since
it was still early afternoon, all his intimidation
was washed out in the burning Iowa sun glaring
off the mud-gray, yet-to-be-sown cornﬁelds on
both sides of the road.
Not that anyone else was there to see us
across the barren ﬁeld, and not that it would
have mattered if we’d been watched by the
local farmers. I was already beaten down as far
as I could go. A small part of me wanted to get
out, walk back to the black-and-white, and say
to the cop, “Don’t you know what we’ve been
through? Don’t you know what my employees
just went through?” But I didn’t. Being pulled
over on the side of an empty two-lane highway
for some imagined trafﬁc infraction on the
worst day of my career left me with little
energy to ﬁght.
My briefcase didn’t contain drug parapher-
nalia, as the deputy hoped, but the documents
that had begun to deﬁne my life as president
of the Clarinda Company. There was the list of
employees we’d ﬁred earlier that day. Forty in
Clarinda and Atlantic, Iowa; a few more in Bal-
timore, St. Paul, Syracuse—though none in
Manila. All in all, 20% of the workforce.
There was also the letter from Dan’s lawyer.
Dan—my former business partner, our ex-CEO,
and my mentor—was threatening to sue me
for ﬁring him a month ago. Did his new lawyer
know that Dan was a drunk? That I’d found
him slumped over his desk one morning with
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vodka sloshing in his “World’s Greatest Dad”
mug? Did Dan explain to the lawyer how I
had hauled him bodily from the Holiday Inn
at the BWI Airport to the emergency room at
the University of Maryland Medical Center in
hopes of reviving the man who had been my
best friend for eight years?
The letter demanded we rehire Dan, which
was almost amusing in the midst of the mas-
sive layoffs. It was thanks to Dan’s dream of
“benevolent capitalism” that we had continued
to hire in the U.S., despite the industry trend to
ship work to Bangalore. The only thing keep-
ing the company aﬂoat now was our decades-
old sales relationships with Pearson, Harcourt,
Thomson, and a handful of other major pub-
lishers. That and our own offshore operation
in Manila—and even there our labor rate of
$6,000 a year was more than triple the costs of
our Indian competitors.
I was only 35, and my career and life had
gone from dreams of wealth and IPOs to
desperation-driven layoffs and days ﬁlled with
new fears and setbacks. Two years earlier, Dan
and I had bought the Clarinda Company out of
default and embarked on a turnaround effort.
In our ﬁrst year, we’d increased sales by 30%
and made the ﬁrst proﬁt the company had
seen in a decade. In our second year, we’d
stalled. And now Dan was gone, I was left be-
hind in my role as president, and we were in
what Rich called a “ﬂat spin—the kind that
planes and companies rarely recover from.”
Thanks to the day’s ﬁrings, we had bought
some time to plot our next maneuver, but
what would it be? It would be nice to save
the company and my own career, but as I
watched Rich in the rearview mirror shake
his head to the police ofﬁcer’s questions, I
wanted out. Just out. Out of the car. Out of
the company. Out of Iowa. Just walk away,
somewhere, anywhere. And if doing that
wouldn’t have put me $2 million in debt
myself—thanks to the personally guaranteed
loans we’d taken out to buy Clarinda—and,
worse, left my ailing father with the chance of
losing his house, I might have done just that.
The deputy returned with Rich walking
alongside. He waved me out of the car, and
with all three of us standing there behind the
rented Buick, he directed me to open the
trunk. Accompanied by the quiet buzz of bees
and grasshoppers, I reached into the cavern-
ous interior—Buicks have great trunk space—
and retrieved the contraband, which bore the
sinister label Precalculus for Beginners.
 
I Need to Get Out
 
“He said we passed a truck going uphill. Did
you see a truck?” Rich asked, shaking his head.
“I wasn’t planning on ever coming back to
Iowa, but this seals it.”
“I’m sorry,” I said.
“It wasn’t your fault, David. He saw the
Virginia license plates and got all excited after
sitting by that empty ﬁeld all day.”
“No, not about that,” I said. “About getting
you wrapped up in this. You should never have
come to work for Clarinda.”
“Oh, that,” he said as he opened a pair of
Ray-Bans with one hand. “You mean the part
where I was going to help you and Dan go buy
companies and instead helped you ﬁre his
drunk ass?”
I’d known Rich since high school. For over
20 years, he’d been my good friend, and now
I’d derailed his career, bringing him in just as
Dan went bad to deal with yet another ﬂop,
hard on the heels of the dot-com implosion
that had been his last job. All his fancy MBA,
CPA, and Ernst & Young–trained skills going to
waste in my desperate little company.
“I’m joking,” he said, his eyes behind the
dark shades now, unreadable. “Come on, so
what now?”
“Now?”
“Do we try to keep the company going or
get you out of this?”
I ﬂipped the pages of the ridiculously color-
ful and enthusiastic textbook in my lap.
Perhaps the cop was right—maybe smoking it
would yield some kind of positive result.
“In or out?” Rich asked.
“Out,” I said. “I need to get out.”
“OK, so ﬁrst we’ve got to ﬁgure out what to
do about your personally guaranteed loans.”
He slowed abruptly, overcompensating as the
speedometer barely edged past 55. “What do
you think about selling the company?”
“I’ll have to tell the customers. Red Bones is
probably already hearing about the layoff.”
“He’s the guy at Pearson, right?”
“Yes, Clarence R. D. Bones, aka ‘Red,’ aka
the guy with the thin lips who’s our biggest
customer.”
“The guy who said Clarinda was his second-
favorite typesetter?”
“That’s the one.”
 
David Silverman
 
 (dsagman@yahoo
.com) is the author of Typo: The Last 
American Typesetter or How I Made 
and Lost 4 Million Dollars (Soft Skull 
Press, 2007), which recounts his efforts 
to revive a struggling typesetting 
company—an experience that serves 
as the basis for this Case. He is currently 
a business-continuity-planning con-
sultant and is working on Jamseed, an 
internet start-up that helps musicians 
find funding for their music. 
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Red’s $3 million was a third of our business
since we’d lost Reed Elsevier just a few weeks
before. The Elsevier letter had read: “We are
selecting three U.S. vendors and sending the
rest to our new partners in India. Your ﬁrm
was number four.” I don’t know how many
number fours there were, but it didn’t matter;
we had gone from $12 million in revenues
to $9 million instantly. We were counting
on $3 million of it from Jackie Dee at TPC.
After that, we had a million pretty much guar-
anteed from IPC Print, and the remaining
two mil was spread among a handful of
publishers—McGraw-Hill, Oxford University,
Thomson. There was no question that each of
our customers controlled a large percentage
of our business and that their buying deci-
sions for the upcoming academic year would
either allow us to survive or put us out of
business—and me into bankruptcy.
“Didn’t you say you’d called Red already?”
Rich asked.
“He wasn’t there. Neither was Jackie Dee. I
didn’t think this was the kind of thing to leave
in a voice message, so I just hung up.” I rolled
down the window and put my hand in the
warm air as we merged onto Interstate 80.
“Somehow when they need me, I’m always
supposed to be right there, but when I need
them—”
“What are you going to tell them?”
“The truth, I suppose. With Dan gone, I
need their help.”
“I mean what are you going to tell them
about the layoff and Dan? Are you going to tell
them he was drinking?”
“What else can I do? You know me. I always
have to tell everybody everything.”
“Maybe you should talk to my attorney,
Jack, ﬁrst.”
“And what’s that going to do?”
“I’m just saying, it couldn’t hurt to talk to
him,” Rich said and hit the pedal hard as we
passed the You Are Now Leaving Iowa sign.
 
And Why Are You Calling 
Customers?
 
In the hotel room in Omaha, I called Rich’s
lawyer friend. As the phone rang softly in my
ear, I folded the corner of the bedspread
down. Since we’d fallen on hard times, I was
forgoing the modest luxury of the Embassy
Suites, and now the red paisley coverlet in the
$40-dollar-a-night room was giving me every
indication that it would glow like a Grateful
Dead poster under black light. When he
answered, I explained our situation. An old co-
worker of Rich’s, Jack was a former corporate
attorney turned business consultant. With his
white beard and silver hair, he often referred
to himself as the “Chief Adult in the Room.”
“And why are you calling the customers,
David?” Jack asked.
I wasn’t sure what he meant. Of course I had
to call the customers, didn’t I?
“Let’s take a step back,” he said. “What’s
making you feel that you’ve got to do this?”
I explained that McSwenson, our Pearson
sales rep, had probably already called two or
three of the buyers there, if not Red Bones, the
production VP, himself. McSwenson had been
selling to the Columbus, Ohio, division of Pear-
son Education for nearly 20 years. With his
sallow cheeks and his shiny jet-black hair—it
had Kiwi written all over it—he’d won the
nickname “the Cadaver” from Dan. He refused
to call on any other customers but, at the same
time, he was blocking our new salesperson,
Beth, from seeking business in other parts of
the Pearson empire. He would call after her
visits to people in the New Jersey headquarters
and remind them that he was “their ofﬁcial ac-
count manager.” He had, as Dan described it,
“pissed a circle around ‘his’ client.”
“And what do you think this ingrate is tell-
ing them?”
“I don’t know,” I said. “Certainly that we’ve
had to let a lot of people go, probably that Dan
was a drunk, and that he will take care of them
like he always has.”
“OK, so they have this information, which
they will know is coming from him, not you,
and they’ll be expecting a call from you to
explain?”
“Yes, I mean, of course. Right? Wouldn’t you,
as a customer?”
“I might, but I’m not that close to it,” Jack
said. “All I can do is remind you that any infor-
mation that’s currently out there is rumor.
Once you say something, it becomes real.”
His attorney background gave Jack such a
different perspective from mine. For the past
two years, I’d been reacting as rapidly as pos-
sible to the customers’ every concern, real or
imagined. At one point, a customer had left
me a harsh voice mail about a project. I called
back immediately to apologize—only to dis-
cover later that his misdialed call had been
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intended for our competitors in Dubuque.
“There’s also our editorial-services division
in St. Paul,” I said. “The editors there are
essentially outsourced employees for Pearson;
they’ll be calling the customer, too.”
“So you’re saying that the customer is deep
in your underwear.”
“And TPC. Steve and Jo from our Atlantic
plant must have called down to their contacts
in San Antonio as I was on my way to getting
pulled over by the highway patrol.”
“I understand you’ve got to deal with that.
What I’m suggesting is that you have options.
What you do next is much more complicated
for you than it is for an employee who doesn’t
have as much at stake. Far bigger companies
than yours carefully assess what they release
and how they state it—and there’s a reason
why it’s usually ‘No comment.’ All you can be
sure of is that your customers will react to
what you say, so why take unnecessary risks?”
“Say nothing?” I shot back. “Let them won-
der what I’m thinking, what I’m going to do
next—have more layoffs or rebound?”
“You could tell them that everything’s ﬁne,
and leave it at that.”
“But if I don’t address the elephant in the
room when I talk to them, they might defect
to our competitors.”
“And if you conﬁrm for them all this
wonderful inside information about Dan’s
drinking, about the loss of business to over-
seas vendors, about the layoff you just had?”
“Well,” I said, and laid my coat down as
a protective barrier on the brown, stained
pillow, “I guess they might defect to our
competitors.”
 
That’s All We’ve Got?
 
At dinner, Rich ordered a Johnnie Walker
Black, ice, and nothing else.
“You’re not going to start, are you?” I asked.
“As your friend, and unlike Dan, I’ll be sure
to tell you in advance if I’m going to screw
you.” He twisted his wrist in a kniﬁng motion.
“In the back?”
“Only in the front. So you can see it,” he said
and laughed.
I laughed, too, thinking how no one laughs
at success, only failure.
“Seriously, tell me,” he continued. “Is
Clarinda what you want?”
“You mean do I want to build a typesetting
empire by getting Clarinda back on track and
buying up other typesetters and then going
public like Dan and I had planned?”
Rich put down his drink and motioned to
the bartender for a glass of water by pointing
at mine. I watched the guy deftly ﬁll a glass
with ice, press the button on the soda gun, and
deposit the drink neatly on the hammered-
copper bar with one hand, scooping up his
tips with the other in one motion.
“No.” I said. “It was Dan’s dream, and I was
along for the ride. Without him, there’s no
dream. Without him, this is just a job.”
“Thank God,” Rich said.
“You’re surprised?”
“Look, I’m here to help you. If you think
we can make a go of it, I’ll do it. If you want
out, I’ll get you out.” He clapped his hands.
“So tell me about those companies that got
bought.”
“Lincoln and ABC sold to Bookers, the
Indian ﬁrm.”
“How much did they sell for?”
“One times sales.”
“And how did they come up with the
revenue number?”
“They would have had to guess; nobody gets
contracts that guarantee actual work.”
“Is that all we have?” Rich asked. “Only
guesses for next year?”
“Well, we’ve got one contract with TPC, al-
though it doesn’t promise any speciﬁc job, and
we’ve got a rough list of books we’re getting
from Pearson. There’s also the journal work
with IPC. That’s pretty much the same every
month, so we can put all those down as regular
and repeatable.”
“What’s to stop Bookers from just taking
our work?”
“Our ﬁne salespeople, apparently.”
“You’re kidding.”
“No, really. The buyers like dealing with the
people they know.”
“And that’s all we’ve got?” Rich bent his red
cocktail straw into a tight knot.
“That’s all we’ve got.”
“So maybe you do need to call them. If we’re
going to sell this company, we need to point to
a book of business.”
“And tell them what? That I’m going to sell,
and I need them to support me by letting me
promise their work to our unknown buyer?”
Rich ﬁnished his whiskey and waved for
another for both of us. “Yeah, something
like that.”
Any information out 
there is rumor. Once you 
say something, it’s real.
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Tell 'Em Everything
 
Lying on the bed, fully clothed, I drifted into a
ﬁtful sleep.
“What’s up, kiddo?”
“Dan?” He looked like he had when we ﬁrst
met in Baltimore all those years ago. The same
houndstooth jacket, yellow tie, brown slacks—
the old-school exec who had befriended me
with kindness, long before he’d given up.
“Of course, my boy, who did you think
would be haunting your dreams?”
“I’d prefer someone else.”
“Would you like to hear me say that I’m
sorry? That I never intended to let the drinking
get out of hand? That I thought we would be
able to make it?”
“Yes.”
“Then I’m sorry, kiddo. But you’ve got big-
ger problems. You’re the one who’s going to
have to call the customers. And be sure to tell
’em everything. They need to know that it’s the
price cuts they’re demanding that’s making
us—I mean you—send work to our Filipino
friends.” Dan’s ethereal image lit a transparent
Benson & Hedges.
“So you want me to say that the layoff’s our
fault because we’re not sending work overseas
faster?”
He ﬂicked imaginary ashes on my suitcase.
“Well my boy, Red’s going to expect you to fall
on your sword, and you need his help.”
“For what?”
“You need a promise of business from Red
whether you’re trying to sell our lovely Clar-
inda to one of those evil competitors or not.
You need his business to keep aﬂoat. Heck, my
boy, you need to be asking for more work to ﬁll
up the gap left by losing Elsevier. And you
need Red to let you ﬁre the Cadaver.”
“Fire McSwenson?” All the recent layoffs,
and I have to ﬁre more people?
“Of course, kiddo, like your new friend Rich
has been telling you. McSwenson’s the most
expensive employee. Haven’t you ﬁgured out
that McSwenson’s commission eats up almost
all the proﬁt on the Pearson account? And re-
mind me, what new accounts has he brought
in, now that he’s working for you and not me?”
I felt my head slip off the coat and directly
onto the mildewed pillow—powerless to cor-
rect the situation.
“And for you to ﬁre the Cadaver,” Dan’s pol-
tergeist continued, “you’re going to have to get
Red’s permission. They’ve been close chums
for decades now, but maybe Red’s ready to toss
over his old friend just like you tossed me
aside. You didn’t have such a hard time ﬁring
your old friend for taking a few sips of vodka.
Maybe Red’s as much of a turncoat as you.”
I pushed myself awake. The display of the
alarm clock glowed 3:00 
 
AM
 
. I felt more at
sea than ever—even my dreams were beat-
ing me up.
 
What Would I Say?
 
What was I going to do? I needed the custom-
ers’ help for so many things. How could I com-
bine asking for a guarantee of existing work
with the ﬁring of expensive and largely useless
sales people whom the customers had, in
some cases, invited to their homes and, at the
same time, without any irony ask for more
work? Dan had misled me so often. What rea-
son did I have to believe his ghoul? For years
the customers had told me that he knew the
business better than anyone. But which Dan
was I listening to? My old friend in a dinner
jacket or the drunk?
Rich was very knowledgeable about oper-
ations and ﬁnance, but he admitted he
wasn’t the best at sales. And Jack, he was
the most reasonable, but the furthest from
the details.
On my way to the airport, I checked my
voice mail. I had two messages. One was from
Red Bones: “Why didn’t you tell me you were
going to have a layoff?” The second was from
Jackie Dee requesting that I “come to San
Antonio early next week, say, Monday.”
As I sat down in the narrow seat and folded
my tray table into the upright and locked po-
sition, I knew that, unless my plane circled
forever on the approach to LaGuardia, I had
to make those calls. What I didn’t know was
what I would say.
 
Want to know what actually happened to the
real-life Clarinda Company? Go to bailusout
.case.hbr.org.
 
How much should Clarinda’s president 
divulge to customers about the company’s 
difficulties? • Four commentators offer expert 
Case CommentarySee
 
advice.
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by Jim Marsh
 
How much should Clarinda’s president divulge to 
customers about the company’s difficulties?
 
Based on my own recent experience, I’d urge
Clarinda’s president to be very open with his
customers about the company’s situation.
When I assumed my current position at Cable
& Wireless in April 2006, we were in a similar,
if somewhat less serious, situation. Our part of
the company had some signiﬁcant problems:
Not only were our customers getting patchy
service, but the business itself was cash nega-
tive. The previous senior management team
had chosen to hold information about ﬁnan-
cial problems close to the chest, so neither
customers nor most of our own employees
were aware of the challenges we faced.
We made an explicit decision to be open
about these problems with both customers
and colleagues. But—and this is crucial—that
openness was accompanied by a road map,
complete with speciﬁc milestones, which laid
out the transformation journey we planned to
take, one on which we wanted customers and
colleagues to join us.
Our executive chairman and I took our mes-
sage on the road, personally delivering it to
each of our major customers around the
world. This was critical, I believe, because cus-
tomers don’t buy from and into companies—
they buy into individuals. It was important
that they see us face-to-face, look us in the eye,
and trust us as individuals—individuals who’d
be able to deliver the changes we were promis-
ing. I gave all key customers my home phone
number and told them to call me anytime,
24/7, if they had a problem.
We also assigned a senior executive to be the
sponsor for each of our top 100 customers, of-
fering to meet with them each quarter. Not
every customer wanted that kind of frequent
contact, but the open channel helped build
trusting relationships.
We found that customers appreciated this
openness—“refreshing” was the term they
most often used—and that if you’re honest
and straight with them, they’ll be understand-
ing of your situation. One of the key things we
got out of our face-to-face meetings was that,
even if customers had lost faith in us because
of our past actions, they really wanted us to be
successful. Mind you, we weren’t asking them
to do us any favors. All we were asking for
was another chance to prove ourselves.
That said, there’s always a question of how
open you should be with customers. Should
David, Clarinda’s president, divulge to cus-
tomers his desire to sell the company, for
instance? In our case, some people were quite
nervous about the idea of divulging the un-
derlying ﬁnancial performance of our part of
Cable & Wireless. But I argued for complete
transparency—even down to the incentives
offered to members of the senior executive
team—because we were asking these people
to trust us. We were under no obligation to
divulge the unconsolidated results from our
business. But our willingness to do so not
only showed customers the magnitude of the
problems we were facing but also generated a
lot of emotional buy-in from them.
I think our honesty had a lot to do with the
success of our transformation effort. More
than two years into it, we’re hitting our mile-
stones on schedule, we’ve helped boost the
company’s share price, and customers have
stuck with us. The decision to be transparent
was absolutely the right one. Clarinda should
move in that direction.
 
Jim Marsh
 
 is the CEO of the Europe, Asia, & U.S. business 
of the London-based telecommunications company 
Cable & Wireless. 
The decision to be 
transparent was 
absolutely the right one 
for us. Clarinda should 
move in that direction.
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Case Commentary
 
by Rick Rickertsen
 
How much should Clarinda’s president divulge to 
customers about the company’s difficulties?
 
David’s guiding principle in talking with Clar-
inda’s customers should be to disclose nothing
beyond what he has to. He’ll have to discuss
the layoffs, of course, which will soon be in-
dustry knowledge, if they aren’t already. He’ll
need to apologize to Red Bones, the Pearson
buyer, for not telling him about the cuts ear-
lier and explain that they resulted from the
loss of the Reed Elsevier business. Otherwise,
all is steady, and serving Pearson remains Clar-
inda’s most important goal.
David should not talk about Dan’s drinking
problem—that has lawsuit written all over
it—simply explaining, if asked, that Dan was
let go as part of the cost cutting. And David
should not mention his desire to sell the com-
pany or, worse, show his despair by asking for
unusual favors or long-term deals.
In rare cases, you might go to customers
with your plan to sell the business. For exam-
ple, you might seek their input on potential
buyers that they would ﬁnd attractive because
of, say, a reputation for efﬁcient operations or
fair dealings with customers. After all, cus-
tomers may know your competitors—who
would be potential buyers—better than you
do because of their own relationships with
them. Or you might get the word out that the
company’s up for sale in order to ﬂush out a
buyer or two and even start a bidding war.
But this is a risky strategy, given that cus-
tomer reactions to a sale are typically nega-
tive. In general, you don’t want to talk about
a sale until a deal is almost done—usually
just days before the purchase agreement is
signed, after most of the details of the agree-
ment have been hammered out. At that
point, you can break the news to customers
with a well-crafted case for how they’ll bene-
ﬁt from the sale—“The buyer can invest
additional capital that will fuel growth,”
“The buyer’s overseas operations will reduce
operating costs,” and the like—after which
the buyer can talk to them as part of the due-
diligence process. Furthermore, telling cus-
tomers could allow competitors to get wind
of the sale and give them the opportunity to
put a negative spin on the news: “Between
you and me, the new owners are jackals; the
company will now be overleveraged; cus-
tomer service will suffer; and, by the way,
the sky is falling.” Rivals will often portray
the sale as a sign of desperation.
There’s something that’s even more impor-
tant here, though, than deciding what to tell
the customers. David has to ﬁgure out what to
do about the business. My advice here: Buck
up, get back on the horse, and try to whip the
business into shape so it’s actually appealing to
a buyer.
Yes, things aren’t going all that well: You’re
in a declining business, facing cheap overseas
competition; you just lost a customer repre-
senting one quarter of your business; and
you’re on the hook for $2 million in person-
ally guaranteed debt. But there are some
bright spots. You have close relationships with
a roster of prestigious customers, such as
Pearson. A competitor was just sold for one
times sales, which implicitly values Clarinda
at $9 million. Perhaps most promising of all,
there are foreign buyers with strong curren-
cies out there doing deals.
Don’t panic! Don’t be weak with custom-
ers. Redouble efforts to provide terriﬁc cus-
tomer service. Seek new customers who will
reduce Clarinda’s reliance on the handful that
dominate the company’s current order book.
That will make the company much more
attractive to acquirers. Even if a buyer does
come forward, you’ll probably be running the
business for another year. You’ve had an
awful few weeks, and your knee-jerk, I-want-
out reaction is understandable. But it would
be a mistake to completely lose perspective
and hold a ﬁre sale in this dark hour.
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How much should Clarinda’s president divulge to 
customers about the company’s difficulties?
 
It would be a mistake for David, our protago-
nist here, to tell customers the whole truth
about Clarinda’s problems and his plans to
look for a buyer. It would also be a mistake to
lie to customers; in a tight industry like this,
people would quickly ﬁnd out. He should do
something that falls between the two ex-
tremes.
The advice of his former partner, Dan, is
about as helpful as the nightmare in which
Dan offers his recommendation. To open up
completely to customers and essentially ask
for their mercy would precipitate disaster. As
Jack, the lawyer, points out, David is under no
obligation to conﬁrm what customers may be
hearing from salespeople. And however loyal
those customers may be, their ﬁrst loyalty is to
their own companies and bosses. If I were a
Clarinda customer—and at Macmillan I was in
a position to be just that—and had a sense that
the business was about to go bust, I’d be head-
ing for the door rather than making promises
to prop the company up.
Keep in mind, too, that even if David suc-
cessfully appealed to customers’ loyalty and
got some informal commitments to continue
purchasing from Clarinda, that wouldn’t
mean much to a potential buyer. If, during
the due-diligence process, a Clarinda cus-
tomer offered a glowing assessment of the
typesetting company, a buyer would simply
assume that something else was going on—
that the customer had been nobbled by Clar-
inda to say nice things about the company.
David’s determination to sell the company
really is the only sensible move, given the
departure of Dan, who seems to have been
the driving force behind Clarinda’s industry
consolidation strategy. To do so, David has to
provide customers with a vision of the com-
pany’s future. What he doesn’t have to say is
that a new owner may be the one to realize
this vision.
The pitch would go something like this:
“Despite the layoffs, Clarinda continues with
its aggressive growth plans. Besides domestic
acquisitions, the company is seeking partners
in India to complement the Philippines oper-
ations. It needs reﬁnancing to realize those
ambitions.” (Technically, a sale of the business
is a form of reﬁnancing.) “Would you, the
customer, be interested in taking a stake in
Clarinda?” (What better way, after all, to
secure their commitment?) “Even if you’re
not, certainly you realize that the offer is
an indication of the conﬁdence we have in
our partnership.” (And this conﬁdence will,
with any luck, be reciprocated.) Or something
like that.
Finding a buyer for Clarinda, with or with-
out a guarantee of continued business from
its customers, isn’t out of the question. Type-
setting businesses in India, including sub-
sidiaries of publishing companies such as
Macmillan, have in fact acquired typesetting
businesses in the United States. Even though
the typesetting can be done much more
cheaply in India, the businesses are attractive
because of their sales teams and their direct
contacts with U.S. customers.
However, the value of salespeople and
their contacts isn’t limitless. If McSwenson,
the Cadaver, is raking in commissions
roughly equal to what he’s bringing into the
company in proﬁts, he should be ﬁred—
and David shouldn’t hesitate to be straight
about it with Red Bones, the Pearson execu-
tive. Red and the Cadaver may be “close
chums,” but Red’s closest chum is his own
boss at Pearson. And if McSwenson is making
exorbitant commissions, Pearson, as well as
Clarinda, ultimately foots the bill. That can
be the subject of an honest conversation.
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Throughout his time at Clarinda, David has
wrestled with the ethics of honesty in the busi-
ness world. Despite becoming somewhat
jaded by his experiences—after all, people
haven’t always been honest with him—he is
still strongly inclined to do what he sees as the
right thing. The implicit beneﬁt of such altru-
ism: By being completely truthful with cus-
tomers, he will gain their trust and therefore
their backing.
But David is making the common mistake
of confusing two different kinds of trust.
What he needs to secure from his customers
is something called competency-based trust.
This is the conﬁdence that someone is capa-
ble and able to deliver the goods—in this
case, that Clarinda has the competence to
meet its obligations to its customers.
David seems to be blurring this in his mind
with something called interpersonal trust. This
is the conﬁdence that someone will support
you when times get tough and that you will
reciprocate—in this case, that Clarinda and its
executives will treat customers with decency
and, in turn, be rewarded with further
business.
Interpersonal trust has a place in business,
but research shows that it can’t be developed
overnight. McSwenson, the Clarinda sales
rep, has built it up with Red Bones, the Pear-
son production VP, over a 20-year period. To
try to do it in a couple of phone calls or a
single meeting will seem disingenuous.
Competency-based trust can be established
more quickly. David doesn’t have to lie, but
he has to be strategic about what he says and
how he says it. My own research shows that
three things are essential to establishing this
kind of trust: David’s message must be simple;
it must reﬂect that he has a clear understand-
ing of the situation; and it must exhibit ratio-
nal decision making.
Thus, in talking about Clarinda’s situation
with customers, David should not go into
laborious detail about the economics of the
typesetting industry. But he should acknowl-
edge the recent loss of a big customer and
other business challenges—especially those
that customers would have heard about
through the grapevine. And he has to con-
vince customers that he is taking rational
steps, such as the layoff of relatively expen-
sive U.S. staff, to meet these challenges.
He might say something like this: “We are
redeploying our workforce, with a larger
number working overseas, but we are keep-
ing critical people in the United States
who are important to our knowledge base—
people who know our customers and have a
ﬁrm grasp of U.S. textbook requirements.”
To engender competency-based trust, David
certainly doesn’t need to get into a discussion
of difﬁcult matters that might, over time,
contribute to interpersonal trust but in the
short term will only make people uncomfort-
able. For example, he doesn’t need to raise
the issue of Dan’s drinking, which is no longer
relevant to Clarinda’s ability to meet cus-
tomer needs. He also doesn’t have to talk
about his desire to sell the company, which
has more to do with his personal ﬁnancial
situation than with the organization’s and
its employees’ capabilities—which is what
will ultimately be important not only to
customers but to potential buyers, as well.
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